

27 March 2025

Research US

Trump's 'Liberation Day' – what to expect?

- We take a look at tariffs enacted so far, what is expected to come into effect on April 2nd and what could be on the menu next. We provide an overview of the expected direct impact on US GDP without retaliation or sentiment effects.
- While tariffs on individual countries or product groups have usually only limited effect on a macro level, small changes add up.
- Fully enacting the expected tariffs on China, Canada, Mexico, cars & car parts as well as steel & aluminum could lift the effective average tariff rate above 13% and weigh on US GDP by 0.5%.
- The reciprocal measures remain the most difficult to predict. We cannot rule out first EU-specific tariff announcements already next week.

Trump has so far enacted tariff changes that have lifted the trade-weighted average tariff rate on all US imports by around 5.5-6.0%-points. While re-rerouting of trade will decrease the effectiveness of tariffs over time, the current level is already close to the highest since the second world war. This means that the changes enacted so far have already had a much more pronounced impact on the economy than all the changes from Trump's 1st term had combined (they lifted the rate by only around 1.5%-points).

Trump has so far enacted a 20%-point increase to tariffs against China. In addition, Trump has set up a 25% tariff on steel and aluminium imports as well partial tariffs against Mexico and Canada. The rate for Canadian energy and potash imports is 10% and 25% for all other imports. Part of the increase for so called USCMA-compliant goods has been delayed until next week, which means only around 50% and 60% of respective Mexican and Canadian imports have been affected thus far. USCMA compliance requires a product to, for example, have a certain percentage of its value originated from North America.

Next week, markets will be paying close attention to both expanding the existing tariffs as well as the introduction of the first, so-called reciprocal tariffs.

What is set to take effect next week?

The largest expected tariff increases next week come in the form of **ending the exemptions for Mexican and Canadian imports**, which would levy tariffs on USD428bn worth of new goods. Trump also announced that **25% tariffs on cars and car parts** will take effect from April 2nd. Domestic value added to USCMA-compliant car and car part imports would be exempted from the tariffs, but otherwise the measures would target all imports and stack on top of any other measures. Mexico, which accounts for around half of all US car imports, would be affected the worst.


All car and car part imports are worth USD286bn and together with the expansion of other tariffs, the **effective average tariff rate could increase by another 5%-points to around 13%**. *The Tax Foundation* has estimated that fully enacted tariffs on China, Mexico,.

We discussed how Trump's policy mix is weighing on US structural growth outlook earlier this week

- *RtM USD - Structural growth concerns*, 25 March

Tariffs are rising at a historic pace

US Trade-Weighted Average Tariff Rate



Sources: Macrobond Financial, U. S. International Trade Commission, U. S. Census Bureau, Danske Bank calculations. Scenarios do not include dynamic effects on demand and trade re-routing, and thus reflect 'maximum' potential increases

Trade-weighted USD has appreciated less than the effective tariff rate has increased

Nominal Trade-Weighted Broad USD Index



Sources: Macrobond Financial, The Fed

Senior Analyst, US Macro
Antti Ilvonen
+358 445 180 297
antti.ilvonen@danskebank.com

Canada, steel and aluminium as well as car and car parts would weigh on US GDP by a total of 0.5%.

Trump has also threatened to apply tariffs on agricultural products next week, but has refrained from specifying the exact scope or size of the measures. He has also pre-announced plans to sanction imports of pharmaceuticals and semiconductors with a rate of ‘25% or higher’ but has not specified the timing or other details for now. We discussed the potential FX impact of the former in *FX Strategy - CHF, EUR and DKK at biggest risk from a US pharma tariff*, 26 March. Finally, Trump announced 25% ‘secondary’ tariffs on countries buying oil and gas from Venezuela from April 2nd. In the past, China has been by far the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, but as the extent of these measures remains highly uncertain, their impact is not included in the figures presented in this paper.

Where is the uncertainty?

The largest uncertainty relates to the threatened reciprocal tariffs. At the beginning of his term, Trump ordered *a comprehensive study* into unfair trade practises against the US. The results are due to be published next week, and they will provide a guideline for the reciprocal measures.

We have previously flagged that the reciprocal approach should not automatically lead to large increases in tariffs against the most important trading partners of the US (see *RtM USD*, 11 February). For instance, the latest *WTO data* suggests that the trade-weighted average tariff rate that the EU charges for non-agricultural goods exports from the US is only 0.9% (vs. 1.4% the other way around). That said, the basis of the reciprocal measures remains unclear. As an example, Trump has previously likened EU’s value added taxes to discriminatory tariffs against the US, as the average EU VAT rate (21.6%) is higher than the average US sales tax (6.6%). While the idea makes little economic sense given that the sales tax can be charged several times on the full price of a product during its value chain, it highlights how difficult it is to make firm predictions on the level of future tariffs.


Recent *media sources* have suggested that the administration is looking to – at least initially – take a more narrow focus on only the countries with the largest trade imbalances. This is in line with earlier comments from the Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, who said back in February that the measures would be applied on a country-by-country basis.

Looking at economies which have the largest absolute trade surpluses against the US, and which have not yet been hit with tariffs, **EU and Vietnam are high up on the list**. Looking at countries which have seen the largest increases in trade surplus against the US since Trump’s 1st term, **South Korea** also stands out. Finally, when looking at countries which have both a sizable trade surplus against the US as well as relatively high existing tariffs against US exports, **India is looking vulnerable** (a position the local authorities have been quick to realize, according to *Reuters*).

All together, we cannot rule out that Trump announces first EU-specific tariffs already next week. A 25% tariff on all EU imports would lift the effective average tariff rate by another 4.5-5.0% all the way to 17-18% - the highest since early 1930s. We also do not think that another 10%-point increase on Chinese tariffs is out of the question.

Average tariff rates charged by US trading partners are generally low and in line with pre-Trump US rates


Average Tariff Rates US Non-agricultural Exports Face (2024)



Sources: WTO

EU, Vietnam and South Korea have seen their trade surpluses with US rising after Trump's 1st term tariffs diverted trade away from China

Change in US Trade Balance since 2018 (USD)



Sources: Macrobond Financia], U. S. Census Bureau

Disclosure and disclaimer

The following disclaimer and disclosure apply to all communication as such, though for the parts that refer to the term “investment recommendation”, the disclaimer and disclosure are only applicable as far as the communication falls under the definition in Regulation (EU)No 596/2014. This communication has been prepared by personnel in the LC&I Sales & Trading departments or non-independent Research departments of Danske Bank A/S. The views set forward in this communication may differ from views or opinions in other departments of Danske Bank A/S. It constitutes a short-term view and is subject to change and Danske Bank A/S does not undertake to notify any recipient of this communication of any such change. Details of the producer’s previous investment recommendations on the relevant financial instrument and all previous investment recommendations made in the past 12 months by the producer will be available upon request.

LC&I’s Sales & Trading departments’ or non-independent Research departments’ personnel are not independent research analysts, and this communication is not intended to constitute “investment research” as that term is defined by applicable regulations. This communication has as such not been prepared in accordance with the legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research and is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of the communication. The personnel in LC&I’s Sales & Trading departments or non-independent Research departments may be remunerated based on investment banking revenues. Danske Bank A/S may hold a position or act as market maker in any financial instrument discussed herein. Prices and availability are indicative and may change without notice.

This communication is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal or tax advice. It does not constitute or form part of, and shall under no circumstances be considered as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase or sell any relevant financial instruments. Danske Bank A/S is not acting as an advisor, fiduciary or agent. Recipients of this communication should obtain advice based on their own individual circumstances from their own tax, financial, legal and other advisors about the risks and merits of any transaction before making an investment decision, and only make such decisions on the basis of the investor’s own objectives, experience and resources.

This communication has been prepared independently and solely on the basis of available information that Danske Bank A/S considers to be reliable, but Danske Bank A/S has not independently verified the contents hereof. While reasonable care has been taken to ensure that its contents are not untrue or misleading, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to and no reliance should be placed on the fairness, accuracy, completeness or reasonableness of the information, opinions and projections contained in this communication and Danske Bank A/S, its affiliates and subsidiaries accept no liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss, including without limitation any loss of profits, arising from reliance on this communication.

For current disclosures of Danske Bank A/S’ interests and potential conflicts of interest regarding issuers and financial instruments subject of investment recommendations please refer to the following webpage: .

Please note that while information on the great majority of relevant issuers and financial instruments are contained on this website, it may not contain information on all relevant issuers and financial instruments. The absence of information on any relevant issuer or financial instrument should not be seen as an indication that Danske Bank A/S does not have any interests or potential conflicts of interest on the issuer or financial instrument. Please contact your Danske Bank A/S representative for information regarding any issuer subject of investment recommendation that is not mentioned on <https://danskeci.com/ci/research/disclosures-and-disclaimers>.

Danske Bank A/S is authorised and subject to regulation by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority and is subject to the rules and regulation of the relevant regulators in all other jurisdictions where it conducts business. Danske Bank A/S is subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (UK). Details on the extent of the regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from Danske Bank A/S on request.

This communication is protected by copyright and is intended solely for the designated addressee. It may not be reproduced or distributed, in whole or in part, by any recipient for any purpose without Danske Bank A/S’ prior written consent.

Disclaimer related to distribution in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, this communication is for distribution only to (I) persons who have professional experience in matters relating to investments falling within article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the ‘Order’); (II) high net worth entities falling within article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order; or (III) persons who are an elective professional client or a per se professional client under Chapter 3 of the FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook (all such persons together being referred to as ‘Relevant Persons’). In the United Kingdom, this document is directed only at Relevant Persons, and other persons should not act or rely on this document or any of its contents.

Disclaimer related to distribution in the European Economic Area

This communication is being distributed to and is directed only at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) who are ‘Qualified Investors’ within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the Prospectus Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/1129) (‘Qualified Investors’). Any person in the EEA who receives this

document will be deemed to have represented and agreed that it is a Qualified Investor. Any such recipient will also be deemed to have represented and agreed that it has not received this document on behalf of persons in the EEA other than Qualified Investors or persons in the UK and member states (where equivalent legislation exists) for whom the investor has authority to make decisions on a wholly discretionary basis. Danske Bank A/S will rely on the truth and accuracy of the foregoing representations and agreements. Any person in the EEA who is not a Qualified Investor should not act or rely on this document or any of its contents.

Disclaimer related to distribution in the United States

This communication was created by Danske Bank A/S and is distributed in the United States by Danske Markets Inc., a U.S. registered broker-dealer and subsidiary of Danske Bank A/S, pursuant to SEC Rule 15a-6 and related interpretations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The communication is intended for distribution in the United States solely to 'U.S. institutional investors' as defined in SEC Rule 15a-6. Danske Markets Inc. accepts responsibility for this investment recommendation in connection with distribution in the United States solely to 'U.S. institutional investors'.

Any U.S. investor recipient of this communication who wishes to purchase or sell any Relevant Financial Instrument may do so only by contacting Danske Markets Inc. directly and should be aware that investing in non-U.S. financial instruments may entail certain risks. Financial instruments of non-U.S. issuers may not be registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and may not be subject to the reporting and auditing standards of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

This communication is for the general information of our clients and is a 'solicitation' only as that term is used within CFTC Rule 23.605 promulgated under the U.S. Commodity Exchange Act. Unless otherwise expressly indicated, this communication does not take into account the investment objectives or financial situation of any particular person.

Report completed: 27 March 2025 at 14:00 CET

Report disseminated: 27 March 2025 at 14:30 CET